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Improving corporate governance where the State is the controlling block holder:  
Evidence from China 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 The State usually remains the controlling block holder after a share-issuance 
privatization (“SIP”). In a study of 630 SIPs from 59 countries, Jones et al. (1999) find that 
the median offering by the State was only 35%, leaving the government not only with a 
controlling stake but also with majority-ownership. This raises several important questions: 
Who is the more effective monitor of management of a listed firm: the State or a private 
owner? Can the State improve performance by making governance changes that go short of 
full privatization? For example, can the State improve performance by transferring ownership 
from bureaucrats to managers of corporatized State-owned enterprises, who have better 
incentives and experience than bureaucrats? In this study, we attempt to shed light on these 
important questions by examining 631 negotiated block trades among different State-
controlled and private shareholders in China during 1998-2002.  
Most empirical studies of privatizations find that full privatizations and, to a lesser 
extent, partial privatizations lead to improvements in firm performance (see the surveys by 
Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002)).1 Our study analyzes the 
impact of changes in corporate governance after partial privatization of State-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) has been completed. Focusing on these “second round” changes in 
ownership, we find that significantly larger improvements in firm performance do occur 
when control is transferred to private owners than when control is transferred to market-
oriented SOEs. Thus, consistent with the literature on block-holder identity, we show that the 
                                                 
1 Full privatization refers to the transfer of control from the State to private owners whereas 
partial privatization refers to the issuance of publicly traded shares by a State-owned 
enterprise where the State maintains majority ownership and/or control. Sun and Tong (2003) 
and Gupta (2005) study the impact of partial privatizations in China and India, respectively. 
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specific managerial expertise and incentives of block holders are important determinants of 
firm value (see the survey by Holderness (2003)).  
 We choose to analyze Chinese firms because intra-governmental block transfers are 
relatively common in China and, until recently, reflected efforts by the Chinese government 
to improve corporate governance while maintaining ultimate control at the country’s largest 
firms.2 The Chinese government uses two basic ownership structures to participate in the 
equity of listed companies: (i) direct control through State Bureaucrats at government 
agencies and ministries; and (ii) indirect, but ultimate, control through market-oriented State-
Owned Enterprises (MOSOEs).3  
  At MOSOEs, the wedge between cash-flow and control rights is smaller than at State 
Bureaucrats due, in part, to differences in managerial compensation. State Bureaucrats are 
not directly rewarded based on the financial performance of the firms they monitor (Xu and 
Wang, 1999), whereas managers of MOSOEs are partially rewarded based on their firm’s 
financial performance (Groves et al., 1995; Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006).  In addition, 
MOSOEs are allowed to retain after-tax profits for internal use, providing management with 
additional incentive to maximize profits.4 Furthermore, as separate legal entities, MOSOEs 
are expected to be more focused on commercial objectives (Broadman, 1997).  
                                                 
2 Official documents and speeches indicate that the Chinese government intended to maintain 
ultimate control over a large segment of the Chinese economy, including those that had been 
partially privatized. See, for example, President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the 15th Congress of 
the Chinese Communist Party in the fall of 1997. According to some observers, Chinese 
authorities sought to improve the corporate governance of State-controlled firms as a means 
of avoiding further privatization (Lin, 2000; Cao, 2000).   
3 This classification relies, in part, on the concept of the “ultimate controlling shareholder” 
introduced in La Porta et al. (1999, pp. 475-476). Without the concept of the ultimate 
controlling shareholder, we would not be able to identify firms controlled by SOEs as being 
ultimately controlled by the State. 
4 According to Lin (2004, p. 130), “state enterprises, collective enterprises, private 
enterprises, and any other enterprises pay an income tax of 33%” and, in addition, must pay a 
value-added tax at 17% for most products. However, managers of SOEs face a number of 
restrictions on how they can use these retained earnings.  
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 In this study, we investigate changes in value and performance when block transfers 
occur at firms that have been partially privatized, but where the State maintained a 
controlling interest. We find significantly larger improvements in value and performance if 
blocks are transferred from State control to private control relative to transfers between State-
controlled entities. We are able to mitigate concerns regarding the endogeneity of ownership 
structure and performance by examining how changes in ownership are valued by the stock 
market. Clearly, it is the changes in ownership that lead to the changes in market valuation 
and not vice versa. 
Our results show the importance of these differences in identity of the block holder. 
For example, focusing on block transfers of at least 20%, we find the excess returns 
surrounding the announcement of transfers from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities 
average 33.6%, as compared with 26.6% for block transfers between State Bureaucrats and 
MOSOEs and 20.9% for block transfers between two State Bureaucrats.  These large value 
increases around control transfers to Private Entities are mirrored in significant 
improvements in accounting performance following block transfers from State Bureaucrats 
or MOSOEs to Private Entities. In the two years after the year these transfers are announced, 
the annual return on assets is more than 130 basis points higher than in the two years before 
the transfer announcement.   
Furthermore, CEO turnover is faster when control is transferred to Private Entities.  
Replacement of the CEO within three months of the block-transfer announcement is 
significantly less likely when a State Bureaucrat is the transferor or transferee. These 
differences disappear when we look at replacements within 12 months of the block transfer 
announcement. 
We contribute to the literature in at least five important ways.  First, we contribute to 
the literature on how State ownership affects the performance of partially privatized firms 
 - 4 -
(Kole and Mulherin, 1997; Sun and Tong, 2003; Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami, 2005a; 
D’Souza, Megginson and Nash, 2005; Gupta, 2005). Our results show that block transfers at 
partially privatized State-controlled firms where the State reduces or relinquishes its 
ownership share are associated with increases in market values and improvements in 
accounting performance that are significantly greater than those associated with block 
transfers among other types of block holders. This is innovative because we isolate the effect 
of privatization, i.e., change from State to private control, from the effects of issuing public 
equity.5   
 Second, we contribute to the literature on why State-owned firms perform poorly. The 
“political view” posits that politicians interfere and pursue political objectives other than 
profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994), whereas the “managerial view” posits that 
States are poor monitors because there is no individual with strong incentive nor is there a 
public price to provide information (Laffont and Tirole, 1993).6 It is difficult to separate both 
effects for SIPs. However, the firms in our sample do have public prices and managers of 
market-oriented SOEs do have incentives to maximize firm value, yet we find that private 
monitors are superior to State monitors. Hence, our evidence is more supportive of the 
political view than the managerial view, and complements Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007), 
who find that politically connected Chinese firms perform more poorly than other listed 
Chinese firms on both a market-value and accounting basis.  
                                                 
5 Gupta (2005) shows that stock market listing of State-controlled firms improves 
performance because of the role the stock market plays in monitoring and rewarding 
managerial performance even when there is no change in control. In addition, studies of 
equity offerings have shown that changes in firm performance around the time of initial 
public offerings are affected by decisions to issue shares during hot markets (Ritter 1991; 
Loughran and Ritter, 1995), or to manipulate earnings prior to share issuance (Teoh, Welch 
and Wong, 1998; Aharony, Lee and Wong, 2000; DuCharme, Malatesta and Sefcik, 2003; 
Chen and Yuan, 2004). 
6 Without share-price information, managers miss important signals about their behaviour, 
face restrictions on performance compensation and are insulated from the market from 
corporate control. 
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Third, we extend the literature on block-holder identity and partial corporate control 
(Holderness and Sheehan, 1985 and 1990; Barclay and Holderness, 1991; Bethel, Leibeskind, 
and Opler, 1998; Franks and Mayer, 2001).  We provide new evidence from Chinese markets 
that changes in firm value associated with block transfers, and subsequent changes in top 
management, are functions of the incentives and managerial skills of the new block holders.  
Specifically, we find that share transfers to private block holders are most effective in 
improving corporate governance and increasing firm value (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris 
and Raviv, 1988; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Because many of the world’s largest 
enterprises, both listed and unlisted, have the State as the controlling block holder (La Porta 
et al., 1999; Claessens, Djankov and Lang, 2000), we regard this as an important extension of 
current research that has focused exclusively on share transfers between private block 
holders.   
 Fourth, our findings contribute to the literature on the consequences of non-tradable 
shares (Karpoff and Rice, 1989; Fan, Wong and Zhang, 2007). Here, we provide evidence 
that changes in block-holder identity can mitigate the adverse consequences of non-tradable 
shares. 
 Finally, we contribute to the growing body of work on China that abandons the 
official ownership scheme, which classifies owners of non-tradable shares primarily into two 
categories—State Shares and Legal-Person Shares. As Delios et al. (2006, p. 319) write, 
“There are liabilities in the official scheme that extend from how it obfuscates the ultimate 
identity and control of a shareholder.” Both State Shares and Legal-Person Shares can be 
owned by the government directly or indirectly through SOEs, while Legal-person Shares 
also can be owned by private domestic investors and private foreign investors. Our 
classification, based upon the work of Delios et al. (2006) and described in detail below, 
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avoids the confusion regarding control and incentives inherent in the official share 
classifications. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In Section 2, we present a brief 
review of the literature on privatization and block holder identity, while, in Section 3, we 
provide institutional details about Chinese stock market and ownership structure of Chinese 
firms.  We discuss the role of the Chinese government and develop hypotheses in Section 4.  
In Section 5, we describe our data and methodology.  In Section 6, we present the results of 
our empirical analysis and, in Section 7, we provide a summary and conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 Denis and McConnell (2003) write that “privatization is a natural experiment 
allowing us to examine how corporate governance mechanisms evolve, interact and affect 
firm performance.” Megginson and Netter (2001) and Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide 
comprehensive reviews of studies published prior to 2000, which generally find that privately 
owned firms are more profitable and efficient than similar SOEs. We briefly summarize the 
findings of some of the most prominent multi-country studies and then review some of the 
more recent studies that look at partially privatized firms. 
 
2.1 Multi-country studies of privatization 
 Boardman and Vining (1989) examine the 500 largest industrial firms outside of the 
U.S. to compare the performance of SOEs, private companies and mixed enterprises. They 
find that SOEs and mixed enterprises perform significantly worse than private companies. 
 Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994) examine changes in performance of 61 
State-owned enterprises from 12 developed and developing countries that were partially or 
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completely privatized during 1961-90. They find that accounting performance improved 
significantly. 
 Boubakri and Cosset (1998) extend the work of Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
(1994) by focusing on firms in developing countries, which constituted only a small portion 
of the earlier study. Analyzing data from 79 State-owned enterprises in 21 developing 
countries that underwent either partial or complete share-issuance privatizations, they also 
find significant improvements in accounting performance. 
 D’Souza and Megginson (1999) compare pre- and post-privatization performance of 
85 SIPs from 28 industrialized countries that occurred from 1990-96. They find that 
profitability, output and efficiency increased significantly after privatization. They conclude 
(p. 1,400) that their results, in conjunction with those of Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
(1994) and Boubakri and Cosset (1998), ”strongly suggest that privatization is a powerful 
tool for improving the financial and operating performance of former state-owned enterprises 
in many different institutional settings.” 
 Jones et al. (1999) analyze 630 SIPs in 59 countries for evidence regarding how 
political and economic factors affect the terms of SIPs. Most relevant for our study, they find 
that the State remains the majority owner in 71.1% of the SIPs, with 35% being the median 
percentage of shares offered.  
 Boubakri, Cosset and Guedhami (2005a, b) investigate the relation between 
ownership structure, investor protection and firm performance using data on 209 privatized 
firms from 39 countries. They find that the State relinquishes control over time to benefit 
local institutions, individuals and foreign investors and that private ownership becomes more 
concentrated over time. The positive effect of private ownership concentration is more 
pronounced in countries with poor investor protection. 
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 D’Souza, Megginson and Nash (2005) find that post-privatization performance 
improvements in developed countries result from changes in government and foreign 
ownership affecting employment and capital expenditures. They also find that institutional 
factors are not very important, in contrast with Boubakri, Cossett and Guedhami (2005b). 
 A few studies cast doubts on the performance benefits of privatization. For example, 
Kole and Mulherin (1997) examine 17 U.S. firms where the U.S. government seized 
enterprises owned by German and Japanese companies, resulting in controlling State blocks 
of 35% or more. During the post-WWII period when the government maintained its 
controlling ownership, they find that the accounting performance of these State-controlled 
firms was not significantly different from privately controlled firms in the same industry. 
They conclude that the comparable performance of State and private firms results from the 
availability and implementation of monitoring devices (e.g., the board of directors and the 
managerial labour market), which, they argue, can favorably affect performance of partially 
privatized but State-controlled firms. 
 Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) use panel data for 63 privatized firms and find 
earnings improve prior to, but decline following, SIPs. They conclude that privatization does 
little to improve performance because the improvements they observe occur just prior to 
privatization, when the State is still the majority shareholder and no public shares have been 
issued. 
 
2.2. Partial-privatization studies 
Is it necessary for State to give up control in order to improve performance, or is 
partial privatization a viable alternative? Nellis (1994, 1999), Boyko et al. (1996) and 
Shleifer (1998), among others, argue that full privatization is necessary to obtain significant 
improvement in the performance of an SOE. On the opposing side, Yarrow (1986), Vickers 
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and Yarrow (1991), Allen and Gale (2000), among others, argue that less drastic measures, 
such as competition, deregulation and partial privatization, can be effective.  
Evidence from a number of empirical studies suggests that less drastic measures can, 
indeed, be effective. Groves et al. (1995) examine the performance of Chinese SOEs 
following a series of 1980s reforms, including corporatization and implementation of 
incentive pay for managers. They find that SOE productivity improved following these 
reforms, and link these improvements to pay-for-performance. 
 Li (1997) also examines changes in the productivity of Chinese SOEs during the 
1980s. He provides evidence that total factor productivity increased significantly between 
1980 and 1989, and provides evidence that most of this increase was attributable to the new 
incentive mechanisms, greater product market competition and better factor allocation. These 
findings imply that significant economic reform of SOEs can be accomplished without formal 
privatization. 
 Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) examine the restructuring of SOEs into corporations 
under the Corporate Law of 1993.  They find that corporatization significantly improved the 
performance of SOEs as measured by profitability and efficiency. Additionally, they find that 
past performance was not a major consideration in the government’s selection of firms to 
corporatize. However, their analysis is based upon a non-random survey of 429 SOEs of 
which 308 were corporatized, which is not likely to be representative of the thousands of 
SOEs involved in the corporatization process. 
 Allen, Qian and Qian (2005) examine three sectors of the Chinese economy: State, 
listed and private. They find that China’s rapid economic growth during the 1997-2002 
period was driven primarily by activity in the private sector. Within the listed sector, they 
find that dividend ratios and firm values are lower than those of comparable firms in 
countries with better legal protection.  
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 Several recent studies examine partial privatization, where the government issues 
publicly traded shares but maintains a controlling stake in the firm. Sun and Tong (2003) 
evaluate changes in accounting performance following the share-issuance privatization of 634 
Chinese firms that went public during 1994-98. They find that earnings, sales and 
productivity improve but ratio measures of profitability (return on sales) deteriorate. They 
also find that performance is related to the type of State ownership, but base this analysis 
upon the official Chinese share classifications. 
Wei, Varela, D’Souza and Hassan (2003) examine the financial and operating 
performance of 208 Chinese corporations that were partially privatized during 1990-97 by 
share-issuance privatization. They find that real output, real assets and sale efficiency 
improve, while leverage declines, following share issuance, but do not find any changes in 
profitability. They also find superior performance for firms where control passed from the 
State to private investors. 
Chan, Wang and Wei (2004) examine the long-term performance of Chinese firms 
that went public during 1993-98. They find that IPO abnormal returns are partly explained by 
the ownership of State and Legal Person entities, based upon official Chinese share 
classifications. They also find that, in the long-term, firms issuing A-shares for domestic 
investors under-perform non-IPO benchmarks. 
 Gupta (2005) investigates whether performance improves following partial 
privatization, i.e., after sale of a non-controlling interest by the State. He uses data on the 
population of Indian SOEs from 1990-2000, to compare the accounting performance of 
partially privatized State-controlled firms with that of SOEs that did not issue public equity. 
The government maintained majority ownership in each of the partially privatized firms, so 
that shares trade but control remains with the State. This enables him to test if it is inadequate 
information about managers that is important to the inefficiency of SOEs. Gupta finds that 
 - 11 -
partial privatization significantly improves performance and that the source of gains is a 
reduction in agency costs that improve firm efficiency. 
 Wei, Xie and Zhang (2005) analyze the relation between ownership and firm value as 
measured by Tobin’s Q for partially privatized Chinese firms during the 1991-2001 period. 
Using official share classifications, they find that both State and legal-person ownership are 
negatively related, whereas foreign ownership is positively related, to firm value. 
 Fan, Wong and Zhang (2007) examine a sample of partially privatized Chinese firms 
for evidence on how political connections affect performance.  They proxy government 
intervention in a firm’s operations by the political connections of the CEO—whether she is a 
current or former Chinese government bureaucrat. They find that politically connected firms 
constitute more than a quarter of their sample of 790 companies and exhibit significantly 
inferior performance relative to their unconnected counterparts, on both accounting and 
market-value bases. 
 Finally, Deng, Gan and He (2007) examine the role of large block holders in 
determining the success of partial privatization in China. They find that parent-company 
block holders are more likely to tunnel resources from listed firms than are other types of 
block holders. 
 
3. Institutional Background 
3.1. Historical Perspective 
In the traditional Chinese SOE that existed from the 1950s until the early 1980s, the 
central government held 100% of the control rights and cash-flow rights, although much of 
the residual cash flows from SOEs were allocated to local governments where the SOEs were 
located. Managers of SOEs were hired and fired by Communist Party officials who led the 
government agencies or ministries responsible for overseeing the SOEs and to which the SOE 
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managers reported. Managers were evaluated based upon their ability to meet 
agency/ministry plans, which involved political as much as economic criteria. Funding for 
SOEs came in the form of “policy loans” from State-owned banks, which essentially 
allocated capital to the Chinese economy rather than performing traditional banking 
functions. So long as an SOE fulfilled its policy role, the central government would ensure 
that it received funds needed for operations regardless of profitability or solvency. Under 
such a system, it is not surprising that SOEs were notoriously unprofitable and inefficient. 
Beginning in 1984, the Chinese government sought to improve the efficiency of its 
SOEs through a series of gradual reforms that began with the accordance of “legal-person” 
status to SOEs, which was intended to make SOEs responsible for performance.7 In addition, 
the central government transferred both the control rights and residual cash-flow rights to 
local-government entities. By pairing cash-flow rights with control rights at the local 
government level, this reform provided local government with the incentive to improve SOE 
performance.  
Local governments responded to the incentives provided by their newfound cash-flow 
and control rights by implementing a series of governance reforms that Groves et al. (1995) 
classify into three strands: (i) giving SOE managers more autonomy from Communist Party 
officials at the agencies and ministries to which they reported; (ii) allowing SOEs to retain a 
portion of any profits they produced; and (iii) developing governance mechanisms to reward 
SOE managers for superior firm productivity.  
In 1993, the National People’s Congress enacted the Chinese Corporate Law of 1993, 
which paved the way for partial privatization of the largest of SOEs.  This law defined two 
types of corporations: closely held and publicly held. For publicly held corporations, the law 
required a governance structure consisting of shareholders who exercise their rights at a 
                                                 
7 See Schipani and Liu (2002). 
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general meeting, a board of directors and a board of supervisors. The law also established the 
positions of CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors.  
For closely held corporations, the Corporate Law sets forth similar requirements, but 
with some exceptions. For corporations wholly owned by the State, the law requires only a 
Board of Directors and a CEO. There is no need for an annual meeting, as the State is the sole 
shareholder, but neither is there a Board of Supervisors or a Chairman of the Board. This 
gave the CEO and Board of Directors of a wholly-State-owned corporation considerably 
more power than their counterparts at other corporations, which allegedly led to problems of 
corruption. In response, the NPC amended the Corporate Law in 1999, requiring wholly-
State-owned corporations to create a Board of Supervisors, whose members would be chosen 
by central government. 
 
3.2 Partial Privatization and official Share Classification 
The (partial) privatization of Chinese SOEs began years before passage of the 
Corporate Law of 1993 when the Shanghai Municipal Government approved a set of regional 
securities regulations in 1984. That approval was followed in the same year by the issuance 
of shares in an electronics company, which began to trade on an over-the-counter market run 
by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in 1986 (see Ellman, 1988; Qi, Wu and 
Zhang, 2000).   
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) was established in December of 1990, 
followed by the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991. Seven SOEs went public 
during 1991.8 Also in 1991, the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (“CSRC”)—the 
Chinese equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission—was established to 
monitor and regulate the two stock exchanges and their members. 
                                                 
8 The primary difference between the SHSE and SZSE exchanges is geographic. The reason 
for establishing two stock exchanges rather than one was to stimulate competition. 
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  Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics about the Chinese stock markets for the 
period from 1992-2002.  During this period the number of firms rose from 53 to 1,224, while 
the market capitalization rose from $13 billion in 1992 to a peak of $579 billion in 2000, 
before declining to $465 billion at the end of 2002.9 Each exchange accounts for 
approximately half of the total number of firms in each year, but there were 206 more firms 
trading on the SHSE than on the SZSE in 2002. 
In China, there are several different “official” classes of shares.  Shares are classified 
based on the residency of their owner as domestic (A shares) or foreign (B, H and N shares).  
Because more than 90 percent of the listed firms have only domestic shares, we delegate the 
description of foreign shares to Appendix I. Domestic A shares are further divided into State 
shares, Legal-Person shares, Tradable A shares, and Employee shares, of which only 
Tradable A shares, as the name implies, are publicly traded on one of China’s two stock 
exchanges. All shares of a listed company have the same voting rights and cash-flow rights, 
i.e., one share is entitled to one vote.  Each of the official share classes is described below.  
Tradable A shares are owned by individual Chinese residents and domestic legal 
persons, but are not allowed to be owned by foreign investors.  They are the only type of 
equity that can be publicly traded among domestic investors.  Individuals are prohibited from 
holding more than 0.5% of total shares outstanding for any listed company. Regulators 
                                                 
9 The Chinese government has struggled for many years in its attempts to resolve the 
problems arising from non-tradable State shares. In 2001, for example, it proposed 
transferring State shares to private investors through open market transactions, but this 
proposal triggered a collapse in the Chinese markets beginning in June of that year. Not until 
2005 did the Chinese government come up with a suitable plan for converting non-tradable 
shares into tradable shares. This plan involved offering various forms of compensation to 
holders of Tradable A shares in exchange for approving the conversion. Most companies 
approved the conversions during 2005-2006 and Chinese share prices rocketed. The Shanghai 
Composite index rose from a low of 1,100 in January 2006 to new highs of more than 5,000 
in September of 2007. However, as of September 2007, the State had yet to relinquish its 
controlling interest in most listed firms because of limitations on the sale of converted shares 
put into place to allay concerns of investors about the potential effects of such sales on share 
prices.   
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typically require that Tradable A shares account for more than 25% of total outstanding 
shares when a company is listed.  The market price of a listed company refers to the price of 
Tradable A shares.  
State shares, Legal-Person shares and Employee shares are non-tradable, meaning that 
they do not trade freely on a stock exchange. These types of shares can only be transferred 
with approval of the CSRC. 
Employee shares are owned by the employees of a listed company.  Employee shares 
are registered under the title of the labour union of the company, which represents the 
shareholding employees and exercises their rights.  After a holding period of six to twelve 
months, the company may file with the CSRC to allow its employees to sell their shares in 
the open market.  Shareholding by managers is small. Tian (2001) reports that average 
managerial ownership for listed Chinese firms during 1994-1998 was as small as 0.005% of 
the total number of shares outstanding. Managers are not allowed to transfer their shares 
during their tenure. 
The distinction between State shares and Legal-Person shares is murky, at best, and 
emanate from a 1994 regulation dealing with restructuring of SOEs.10 State shares are those 
held by government agencies (e.g., the Bureau of State Property Management and local 
finance bureaus) and by some types of corporatized SOEs. For most listed companies, State 
shares make up the largest percentage ownership of any classification.  Legal-Person (LP) 
                                                 
10 Article 8 of the Regulation for State-owned Shares in Stock Corporations, which was 
announced on November 3, 1994 by the State Reform Commission for Economic 
Restructuring and the State Assets Management Bureau, sets forth how contribution of State 
assets to a stock corporation are to be classified. If a stock corporation is created out of the 
assets of existing SOEs and the percentage of the stock corporation’s assets accounted for by 
contributed State assets is less than 50, then the assets are classified as State-owned Legal- 
Person shares; if greater than 50, then the assets are classified as State shares. If a subsidiary 
of an SOE is restructured as a stock company, then all of the assets should be classified as 
State-owned Legal Person. If an entire SOE is restructured into a stock corporation, then all 
of the assets should be classified as State share. If the stock corporation is newly set up, then 
assets from the government should be classified as State shares, and assets from SOEs or 
their subsidiaries should be classified as State-owned Legal-Person shares. 
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shares are those owned by domestic corporations or other non-individual legal persons. 
Hence, this category includes shares held by the government through legal-person entities, as 
well as shares held by private entities, both domestic and foreign. Like State shares, Legal-
Person shares cannot be traded on the two exchanges or transferred to foreign investors, but 
can be transferred to domestic corporations, when approved by the CSRC.  
Table 2 presents an overview of the percentage of total shares in each of the different 
share classes across Chinese firms from 1992 to 2002.  The table shows that State shares, 
Legal-Person shares, and Tradable A shares are the three dominant share categories.  
Tradable A shares have been growing steadily during the past 15 years. In the year 2002, 
listed firms had, on average, 47.2% State shares, 17.3% Legal-Person shares, 25.7% 
Tradable A shares and 9.0% Foreign (Tradable B and Tradable H) shares. It is interesting 
that, although the total percentage of State shares is relatively stable, State ownership 
underwent substantial changes throughout our sample period.  
The typical method used to transfer control at listed companies is known as a share-
transfer agreement. Once a share-transfer agreement is reached between two parties, the listed 
company will apply to the CSRC and the Ministry of Finance to obtain approval. At the same 
time, the firm will make a public announcement regarding the proposed changes in its 
ownership structure.  For example, on November 20, 1998, both the Securities Times and the 
Chinese Securities published the announcement by the board of Shaanxi Precision Alloy Co., 
Ltd. that the original shareholder—Shan Xi Province State Asset Management Bureau—had 
signed a stock transfer agreement with Shenzhen HuaTian Electricity Investment Co., to 
transfer its 31.64% State block holding of Shaanxi Precision Alloy Co., Ltd. to Shenzhen 
HuaTian Electricity Investment Co. In the announcement, Shenzhen HuaTian Electricity 
Investment Co. is described as a corporatized SOE.  
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3.3 Alternative Share Classification 
There are serious shortcomings in the official share classification for any analysis of 
corporate governance of listed firms in China. To illustrate the confusion, we refer to Table 5 
in Delios et al. (2006) where the authors report the overlap between their 17 (ultimate) 
ownership categories and the official Share Classification. For example, of the 556 times a 
State Asset Management Bureau (SAMB) was classified as a top-10 shareholder in a listed 
firm in their sample, the SAMB was officially classified as holder of State shares 105 times 
(19 percent), as a Legal Person shareholder 221 times (40 percent), and in 230 cases the 
SAMB was classified as A-shareholder or ‘Other’. Similarly, Private Corporations were 
officially classified as holders of State shares in 7.4 percent of the cases, as holder of Legal 
Person shares in 59.8 percent of the cases, and as holder of Tradable A shares or ‘Other’ in 
32.8 percent of the cases.  
Because of these ambiguities, we adopt the classification scheme of Chinese 
ownership developed by the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) Business School and 
described in Delios et al. (2006). The NUS-classification produces 17 detailed classes of non-
tradable shares, which we regroup in four groups of ultimate owners. The groups are as 
follows (where we refer to the Delios et al. (2006) detailed classifications in parentheses). 
State Bureaucrats includes: central government (1); local governments (2); government 
ministries (3); government bureaus (4); State asset-investment bureaus (6); State asset-
management bureaus (7); State research institutes (10); and State-owned banks (16). The 
group Market-Oriented SOEs includes companies that formerly were government ministries 
(5); market-oriented state-owned enterprises (9) and infrastructure construction companies 
(8). The Private Entities classification includes security companies (11); investment funds 
(12); private companies (13); private individuals (14); and work unions (17). The group 
Foreign Entities includes foreign companies and individuals (15).  
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The distinction between State Bureaucrats and Market Oriented SOEs (MOSOEs) is 
important because the incentives (e.g., profit-sharing) and expertise (e.g., managerial and 
industry expertise) of managers of market-oriented SOEs are fundamentally different from 
those of government bureaucrats. We return to this issue in the next section. 
 Table 3 shows the distribution of ownership categories of the largest block holder for 
listed firms by year, from 1993-2002, based upon our classification scheme. Beginning in 
1996, MOSOEs dominate the sample. The number of State Bureaucrats remains relatively 
constant from 1996-2002, while the number of Private Entities steadily increases from 13 in 
1993 to 155 in 2002. The number of Foreign Entities ranges from 9 in 1993, to 18 in 1996. 
The annual total numbers of firms in Table 3 differs from totals in Table 1 because NUS was 
unable to classify a small number of firms. 
 
4. Ownership Structures and Hypotheses 
4.1 Government Ownership Structures 
Because of differences in incentives and residual cash-flow rights, we expect that the 
two alternative government ownership structures (State Bureaucrats vs. MOSOEs) have 
differential impacts on firm value, even though the State is the ultimate controlling 
shareholder in each case. State Bureaucrats (“SBs”) such as the Bureau of State Property 
Management or local finance bureaus exercise ownership rights on behalf of the Chinese 
State.  When a SB controls the majority of the shares in a company, officials of the block 
holder have the right to select board members and chief officers, and to veto business and 
investment plans proposed by firm management. As government officials, however, they are 
prohibited from involvement in the management of State-controlled firms.11  
                                                 
11 In the 1984 “Decision on Reform of the Economic Structure,” it is declared that 
government departments will not manage or operate enterprises directly (Cao, 2000). This 
measure was aimed at transforming State-run enterprises into State-owned enterprises. 
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SB officials have no residual cash-flow rights from the companies they monitor; all 
dividend revenues from the companies under their control are submitted to the Ministry of 
Finance or to local governments. Moreover, SB officials are not rewarded based on the 
performance of the SOEs that they monitor (Xu and Wang, 1999; Lin 2000).12   
SB officials typically have little or no management experience and little industry-
specific knowledge (Firth, Fung and Rui, 2006).  Hence, it is difficult for them to evaluate 
management decisions. The promotion of SB officials depends largely on how well they 
execute the instructions of central or local government rather than how much they contribute 
to creating firm value or dividend revenues. Based on these characteristics, we hypothesize 
that SB-officials are unlikely to have profit maximization as the primary goal for SB-
controlled listed firms. 
In contrast to SB officials, the managers of MOSOEs typically receive explicit 
monetary rewards based on their firm’s performance (Groves et al., 1995; Firth, Fung and 
Rui, 2006). This incentive compensation at MOSOEs reduces the wedge between cash-flow 
and control rights, which should mitigate agency problems between the controlling block 
holders (the MOSOE) and minority shareholders of the listed firm. Furthermore, MOSOEs 
have a degree of autonomy and are allowed to retain their after-tax profits, which can be used 
according to their own plans.  This provides managers of MOSOEs with greater incentive to 
focus on profitability than managers of SBs.13   
Finally, changes in the identity of the block holder can increase firm value by 
improving the quality of management and/or monitoring (Barclay and Holderness 1991).  
                                                 
12 Of course, SB-officials (as well as MOSOE-officials) enjoy the benefits of indirect 
perquisites, which can be substantial, including luxury housing, car with driver, expense 
accounts, etc. 
13 When we analyze share transfers among State entities, it is unlikely that there is a 
substantial change in the calculated control rights and cash flow rights of the ultimate owner 
around the share transfers in our study. Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) show that, across a 
sample of 750 State-controlled firms, the average ratio of cash flow to voting rights of the 
ultimate owner equals 96 percent.  
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Because of their managerial experience in industry, we expect that MOSOE block holders are 
more efficient and professional than government officials in monitoring the firms under their 
control.  In some cases, MOSOEs contribute directly to the listed firms under their control, in 
the form of management, capital or new technology. According to Zou (2004), the Chairman 
of the SOE-controlled listed firms is also the Chairman of the parent SOE in more than 60 
percent of the cases. This number is only 16 percent for listed companies that are controlled 
by SBs. Furthermore, Chen and Wang (2004) show that top-executive turnover is 
significantly more sensitive to firm performance at listed firms controlled by MOSOEs than 
at listed firms controlled by SBs. 
 
4.2 Private Ownership Structure 
When a private entity is the controlling block holder, the incentives of the block 
holder are most closely aligned with those of minority shareholders. Private block holders 
receive 100% of the cash flows to which the block holder is entitled, in contrast to both 
government ownership structures. Hence, private block holders are more likely than State 
block holders to pursue the maximization of shareholder wealth.14 Also, private block holders 
choose managers on the basis of their ability to maximize shareholder wealth (or, at least, to 
maximize the controlling block holder’s wealth) whereas State block holders choose 
managers based, often in large part, upon political considerations and the ability to meet 
social objectives. 
However, controlling block holders also have incentives to expropriate wealth from 
minority shareholders, especially in countries with weak investor protection (La Porta et al. 
1999; Johnson et al. 2000). Fan, Wong and Zhang (2005) show that, across a sample of 750 
State-controlled firms, the average ratio of cash flow to voting rights of the ultimate owner 
                                                 
14 Cull and Xu (2005) find that private owners reinvest profits in the firm at higher rates than 
State owners. 
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equals 0.96. For the 62 listed firms in their sample that are controlled by private entities, they 
find that the average ratio of the cash flow to voting rights is 0.54. Given the larger wedge 
between cash flow and control rights at listed firms with private entities as ultimate owner, 
we conjecture that expropriation of minority shareholder wealth is more severe after block 
transfers to private owners. 
Evidence in Berkman, Cole and Fu (2008) is consistent with this conjecture. These 
authors find that Chinese firms are more likely to issue loan guarantees to their controlling 
block holder—a form of tunneling—when the controlling block holder is private rather than 
State controlled, either directly or indirectly through an SOE. However, Cheung et al. (2005) 
analyse a sample of 294 connected transactions between Chinese listed firms and their 
controlling shareholders during 2001-2002, and conclude that state ownership does not 
appear to protect firms from expropriation. They report that minority shareholders in firms 
conducting connected transactions with SOEs, end up significantly worse off than minority 
shareholders in firms conducting connected transaction with non-SOEs. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
Based on the differences in corporate governance among SBs,  MOSOEs and Private 
Entities, we hypothesize that MOSOE block holders are more likely to contribute to value 
creation than SB block holders, and that Private Entity block holders are more likely to 
contribute to value creation than either type of State block holder. This should be observable 
in differences in abnormal returns and subsequent accounting performance following the 
announcements of block share transfers from SBs to MOSOEs, relative to share transfers from 
SBs to SBs, and from SBs or MOSOEs to Private Entities.  We refer to this as the incentive 
hypothesis. 
One alternative view of block transfers from SBs to MOSOEs is that such transfers 
introduce an additional level of bureaucracy that might oppose changes (Broadman 1997). 
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MOSOEs are typically fully owned and controlled by the State.  Their weak governance 
structure might simply be mapped onto the listed company as MOSOEs themselves are often 
owned by SBs. If so, then we should expect zero or negative returns around the 
announcements of block transfers from SBs to MOSOEs, and we should expect accounting 
performance to deteriorate in years following the announcement.  We refer to this as the 
added-bureaucracy hypothesis. 
Yet another view of block transfers arises from the widely publicized manipulation of 
stock prices at Chinese firms. According to this view of the world, negotiated block transfers 
are revealed to insiders long before they are publicly announced in the financial press.  This 
presents insiders who own non-tradable shares the opportunity to accumulate large positions 
in Tradeable A shares in the names of family, friends or fictitious parties prior to public 
announcement of the block transfer. Once the transfer is made public, along with promises to 
restructure the listed firm, investors bid up the stock price. At that point, the insiders dump 
their shares, earning substantial profits, but also putting downward pressure on the share 
price. Longer term, the attractive restructuring plan that caused the share price increase is 
never implemented, so the accounting performance fails to improve or deteriorates during the 
years subsequent to the block transfer.  We refer to this as the manipulation hypothesis. 15 The 
                                                 
15 One example of share price manipulation is the Zhongke Changye scandal (See Business 
China, March 26th 2001, pp. 2-3, “Scam of the century”). This particular case started with a 
sharp decrease in the stock price of Zhongke Changye—a listed chicken farm—due to an 
outbreak of bird flu in 1998. The share price dropped to around 14 Rmb in Oct 1998. Mr. Lu 
convinced the largest holder of tradable shares of Zhongke Changye—Mr. Zhu—to transfer 
blocks of tradable shares to him and persuaded several block holders to transfer their State 
shares to high tech companies owned by him. Mr. Lu, who now effectively controlled the 
firm, was in a position to manipulate the flow of public information. In addition, he used 
thousands of ID cards to open new individual share holder accounts, which were used to buy 
shares. In this process, Mr. Lu used the newly purchased shares as collateral to buy even 
more shares. The share price increased to about 40 Rmb in May 1999 when Mr. Zhu 
(unbeknownst to Mr. Lu) started selling. Still, the share price increased further and reached a 
high of 84 Rmb in February 2000 before it collapsed and the scam was revealed. 
 Another example is the Yellow River Chemical scandal (SHSE ticker 600091). This 
case began on December 23, 1998, with the sale of a subsidiary of Yellow River to Baotuo 
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manipulation hypothesis predicts large positive abnormal returns preceding share transfers, 
irrespective of the identity of the initial owner.  
Our final hypothesis deals with the incentive of a controlling block holder to 
expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. While all three types of controlling block 
holders face this incentive, a private block holder might be able to more easily accomplish 
expropriation by funnelling resources from the listed firm to a privately held company that 
she also controls, but where she holds all of the cash-flow rights rather than only a portion. A 
scandal surrounding the De Long Group is an example of this type of behaviour, where a 
private controlling block holder—Tang Wanxin—expropriated wealth from listed companies 
that he controlled to a privately held parent company that he also controlled, but where he 
held greater cash-flow rights.16 We refer to this hypothesis as the expropriation hypothesis. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Chuangye. Baotuo Chuangye, in turn, was partially owned by Beida Tomorrow Materials 
Science & Technology Co., Ltd. (“Beida Materials”)—a firm linked to the Beijing University 
group. Sale of the subsidiary resulted in more than 30 percent increase in Yellow River 
Chemical’s profits, which would give the firm the right to issue new shares. On July 29, 
1999, press reports announced that Beida Materials had bought 47 percent of the shares of the 
parent of Yellow River—Baotou Chemical Industry Group. When the transfer was 
announced, the share price of Yellow River Chemical was 24.5 Rmb—almost double its 12.8 
Rmb price two months earlier. The gradual increase in share price during the two months 
before the announcement was allegedly attributable to insider trading. Supposedly, insiders 
were buying Yellow River Chemical shares in anticipation of a positive reaction of investors 
to the share transfer, which suggested a move away from the chemical industry into the high 
tech industry. However, in the six weeks following the announcement, the share price of 
Yellow River Chemical dropped almost 20 percent, which was attributed to profit taking by 
insiders. (See Larry Lang in New Fortune magazine, August 2001) 
 A very similar incident, where a block transfer suggested a link to Beijing University, 
took place on August 25, 1999 when 51 percent of the shares in the second largest 
shareholder of Huazi Shiye (SHSE ticker 600191) were transferred to Beida Materials. In the 
three months prior to the transfer announcement, the share price of Huazi Shiye increased 
from 13.3 RMB to 22.58 RMB; in the three months subsequent to the transfer announcement, 
Huazi Shiye’s share price declined to 15.6 RMB. 
 It is noteworthy that, in both the Yellow River Chemical and Huazi Shiye examples, 
the block transfer took place in the shares of a firm that controlled a listed firm, rather than in 
the shares of the listed firm itself. It is much easier to conduct such transfers anonymously 
because disclosure requirements are much less stringent for share transfers of unlisted firms.  
16 In what many newspapers referred to as “China’s biggest stock scandal,” Tang Wanxin 
used his family’s control of De Long International Strategic Investment Co., Ltd—a privately 
held conglomerate—to manipulate the share prices of three of its publicly traded 
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This hypothesis predicts that accounting performance will deteriorate during the years 
subsequent to the block transfer and that this deterioration will be greatest for transfers to 
private block holders. To the extent that investors anticipate this expropriation, the hypothesis 
also predicts negative excess returns around the announcement of such block transfers, and 
that these negative excess returns will be greatest for announcements of transfers to private 
block holders. 
Summary of Predictions by Alternative Hypotheses 
 
 Pre-   Post-  Change in 
 Announcement Announcement Announcement Accounting 
 CARs CARs CARs Performance 
Incentive Hypothesis + + 0 + 
Added Bureaucracy Hypothesis  − − 0 − 
Manipulation Hypothesis + + − 0/− 
Expropriation Hypothesis − − 0 − 
 
Above is a summary of the predictions by each of our four competing hypotheses 
regarding the expected stock price reactions to the block transfer announcements and the 
expected change in accounting performance following the block transfers.17 During the pre-
announcement period, both the incentive and manipulation hypotheses predict positive 
abnormal returns as insiders buy up shares in anticipation, while both the added bureaucracy 
and expropriation hypotheses predict negative abnormal returns, as insiders would dump 
shares.  
                                                                                                                                                        
subsidiaries—Shenyang Hejin, Torch Automobile and Xinjiang Tuhne—each of which 
experienced share-price increases of more than six-fold between 1997 and 2004. De Long 
then pledged equity of its subsidiaries as collateral to obtain bank loans for the parent 
company. Beginning in May of 2004, the share prices of the three subsidiaries began to 
plunge as investors learned about the loans and sold off shares of the listed subsidiaries. As 
the value of lenders’ collateral dropped, they called upon De Long for additional collateral, 
which De Long could not provide, leading to its financial collapse. Ultimately, the Chinese 
government took over De Long and liquidated its assets to pay off the bad loans. See Hirson 
(2006).  
17 These predictions are for the sample as a whole, and are based on the observed shift in 
average ownership from SBs to MOSOEs, and from SBs and MOSOEs to Private Entities. 
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At the public announcement of the block transfers, the incentive hypothesis predicts 
positive abnormal returns as investors react to the prospects of more efficient operation of the 
firm, especially when shares are transferred to private block holders.  The added bureaucracy 
hypothesis predicts negative abnormal returns as investors react to the prospects of less 
efficient operation of the firm, if control is transferred to a MOSOE. The manipulation 
hypothesis predicts positive abnormal returns at the announcement regardless of transferee 
identity. However, in the post-announcement period, negative CARs are predicted as insiders 
take profits by dumping their shares. The expropriation hypothesis predicts negative 
abnormal returns, as investors react to the prospects of expropriation by another block holder, 
especially when the block holder is private. 
During the years subsequent to the block transfer, only the incentive hypothesis 
predicts positive performance relative to the pre-announcement period, as more efficient 
operation of the firm leads to improvement in profitability, especially where the new block 
holder is private. Each of the remaining hypotheses predict negative changes in performance, 
as the firm is run less efficiently or is plundered by the new block holder. 
 
5. Data and Methodology 
5.1.1 Sample Selection 
 We include in our sample all SHSE and SZSE firms that, during the five-year period 
from 1998 through 2002, reported share transfers that are greater than 5% of the total number 
of shares outstanding. The announcement dates were obtained from GTA/CSMAR, one of the 
largest corporate information providers in China. Our sample period starts in 1998, so that all 
events in our sample were announced subsequent to the September 1997 Chinese Communist 
Party’s 15th Congress where the Central Committee endorsed a major policy shift, 
committing to a large privatization program. We confirmed each block transfer using 
 - 26 -
ownership data obtained from the database of Chinese ownership developed by the National 
University of Singapore (“NUS”) Business School, and described in Section 3.  This database 
ends in 2002.  
We begin with a sample of 1,040 successful block-share transfers. We are unable to 
match 189 of these transfers with the NUS database, leaving 851 share transfers. Of these 
transfers, 171 involve more than one transaction on the same day for the same firm. We 
delete 36 of these transfers from our sample because the transferors or transferees involved in 
the multiple transfers are from different ownership categories. We combine the percentage of 
shares transferred for the remaining transactions if the parties involved in the multiple 
transfers are the same, or if the transferors involved are from the same ownership category 
(State Bureaucrat, MOSOE or Private Entity), and the transferees involved are from the same 
ownership category (State Bureaucrat, MOSOE or Private Entity). This procedure leaves us 
with 717 observations.  
In order to have a sharp distinction between the three main ownership groups—State 
Bureaucrats, MOSOEs and Private Entities—we exclude 50 transfers involving parties that 
are classified as ‘companies that formerly were government ministries’ (NUS category 5); 
State research institutes (NUS category 10); State-owned banks (NUS category 16) and work 
unions (NUS category 17).  
We also exclude 21 transfers involving foreign entities (NUS category 15). Most of 
these transfers only involve transfers between two foreign entities, and only three of these 
transfers are larger than 20 percent of the shares. This leaves us with our 646 transfers.  
In the final step in the sample selection, we require that the firms in our sample have 
accounting data and stock-price data in the year prior to the transfer. This requirement 
reduces our final sample to 631 block transfers. 
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5.1.2 Descriptive Statistics  
 Table 4 presents descriptive statistics regarding the pre-transfer ownership structure 
and firm characteristics of the sample.  Panel A of Table 4 reports the results for the total 
sample, while Panels B-F of Table 4 report the results for the different subsamples based on 
the identity of the transferor and transferee.  
In Panel A of Table 4, we see that the average percentage of shares being transferred 
is 22.0 and ranges from 5 percent to 74.8 percent. We measure firm size by the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets.  The average size of firms in our sample is 
RMB1.18 billion (US$143 million), and firm size ranges from RMB 70 million to RMB 22.1 
billion.  
We calculate the leverage ratio for each firm as its book value of total liabilities 
divided by its book value of total assets.  The average leverage ratio is 46.8%.18  The high 
leverage ratios in our sample reflect the fact that most listed Chinese companies use bank 
loans as their primary source of capital. The four largest banks in China, which control the 
majority of banking assets in the country, are directly controlled by the Chinese government. 
These banks typically allocate credit to individual firms on the basis of national policy, but do 
not have the power to force a firm into liquidation.  
Industry-adjusted return on assets (ROA) is the firm’s net income divided by the book 
value of total assets as of year-end minus the median ROA for the firms in the same industry.  
We define industry sectors at the level of two-digit SIC codes, which we obtained from the 
CSRC. The average industry-adjusted ROA of our sample firms in the year before the 
transfer is significantly negative at −1.2 percent (t-statistic is −3.5).  
 In Panels B through F of Table 4, we present the descriptive statistics for each of the 
nine transferor- transferee pairs. From Panel B, we see that State Bureaucrats were involved 
                                                 
18 There are no finance companies in the sample.  
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as transferor in 167 transfers, and as transferees in 85 transfers. MOSOEs were transferor in 
340 transfers and transferee in 308 transfers. Finally, Private Entities were involved as 
transferor in 124 transfers and as transferee in 238 transfers. These numbers reflect a clear 
shift in ownership from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities over our five-year sample 
period. 
 Panel C of Table 4 shows that transfers involving State Bureaucrats as transferor are 
largest on average at 26.5 percent of the shares outstanding. When State Bureaucrats are 
involved in the transfer as transferee, the average transfer size is 25 percent. Test 1 in the last 
column of Panel C, reports the results of an F-test of equality of the mean transfer percentage 
between the three ownership categories, and shows the percentage of shares transferred is 
significantly different across the three transferor categories. Similarly, Test 2, in the bottom 
row of Panel C, indicates significant differences in the percentage of shares transferred across 
the different types of transferees.   
 From Panel D of Table 4, we see that transfers where State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs 
are involved in transfers as buyer or seller are significantly larger than transfers to or from 
private owners. 
Panels E and F of Table 4 show the leverage and industry-adjusted ROA, 
respectively, for each pair of transferor and transferee.  Average leverage is 0.47 and average 
industry-adjusted ROA is -0.012, but there are no significant differences across types of 
transferor/transferee. 
 
5.2 Methodology 
The purpose of our empirical analysis is to evaluate the efficiency of alternative 
categories of block owners of listed firms in China.  First, we analyze share-price responses 
around block-transfer announcement dates for the full sample, and for several portfolios, 
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based on the ownership of the transferor and the transferee.  Second, we analyze the change 
in accounting performance in the years around the block transfer. Finally, we examine 
changes in the top management during the period following the block transfer 
announcements.  
Our event-study approach to analyse the impact of ownership changes reduces any 
endogeneity problems, which affects studies using cross-sectional regressions of firm value 
against ownership variables (see Holderness (2003)). In our study, it is likely that changes in 
firm value, or firm performance, in the period around changes in ownership structure, are the 
direct result of these ownership changes.  
We use the market-adjusted return model to calculate daily abnormal returns as the 
difference between the realized return and the market return.19 To estimate the market-
adjusted model, we use as the market index either the SHSE or the SZSE composite index, 
depending on where the firm’s stock is listed. Both composite indices are value-weighted, 
consisting of all listed companies on each stock exchange. Our primary event window spans 
day t–210 through day t+40.20 We use a long event window motivated by concerns that 
market information leakage and insider trading are not unusual in the Chinese markets.21  For 
robustness, we also examine abnormal returns from a short, 5-day window from day t–3 to 
day t+1. In addition, we analyze changes in industry-adjusted return on assets and industry-
adjusted return on equity around ownership transfers, and CEO turnover in the 3 months and 
twelve months after the transfer announcement.  
 
                                                 
19 Our results are robust to use of the market model for estimation of abnormal returns. 
20 For some companies, trading is halted on the event day.  In these cases, we use the closing 
price for the next day as the day t−0 share price. 
21 See, for example, the article ‘Stocks, Lies and Manipulation’, Business China, September 
11, 2000, pp. 4-5. 
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6. Results 
 We first present the results of univariate analyses, where we focus on the relation 
between the variables of interest (changes in firm value, accounting performance and CEO 
turnover) and the identity of the transferee and the identity of the transferor. In the second 
part of this section, we present the results of cross-sectional regression models, where we 
account for characteristics of the transfer and of the listed firm whose shares are transferred.   
 
6.1 Univariate Analysis  
6.1.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
 Figure 1 graphs the cumulative abnormal returns from day t–300 to day t+100.  
Clearly evident in the graph is the share-price run-up from approximately day t–210 through 
day t–1, suggestive of information leakage and insider trading.  Barclay and Holderness 
(1991, p. 865) document a similar pattern for negotiated block transfers between private U.S. 
firms, beginning at about day t–160.  
Panel A of Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for the cumulative average abnormal 
returns (CAR) for day t–210 through day t+40, and for the CARs for day t–3 through day 
t+1. We present these results for the whole sample of 631 transfers that are larger than five 
percent of the shares outstanding, and for a smaller sample of 292 transfers that are larger 
than 20 percent of the shares outstanding.  
As shown in column 3, the average CAR for the full sample is 17.1%, significant at 
better than the 0.01 level. The CAR for our full sample is substantially larger than the 5.7% 
CAR for day t–40 through t+40 reported by Barclay and Holderness (1991) for firms 
remaining independent after the block transfer announcement.22 Franks and Mayer (2001) 
                                                 
22 When making this comparison, it is important to keep in mind the significant differences in 
the Chinese stock market, where insider trading is rampant and the U.S. market, where 
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analyze a sample of block transfers at German firms and find that the benefits of control 
transfers do not accrue to minority shareholders. They attribute this result to the weak 
protection of minority shareholders in Germany. In light of their finding and given the 
relatively weak minority shareholder protection in China23, the large value increase around 
the block transfers in China is remarkable and suggestive of substantial improvement in firm 
performance after the block transfer.  
The average CAR over the period (−210, 40) for the 292 transfers of blocks of shares 
larger than 20% of the shares outstanding is 21.0 percent, which is also significant at the 1 
percent level.24  The CAR over the shorter five-day window from day t–3 through day t+1 is 
1.1 percent for the whole sample and 1.7 percent for the block transfers in excess of 20 
percent of the shares outstanding.25 Both these CARs are also significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
In Panel B of Table 5, we present the average 250-day CARs for the nine different 
groups of block transfers. With the exception of transfers from Private Entities to State 
Bureaucrats and MOSOEs, the CARs in all cells are significantly different from zero. 
Transfers where the State Bureaucrats are transferor have the largest average CAR of 21.6 
percent. For transfers from MOSOEs, the average CAR is 16.7 percent, whereas transfers 
from Private Entities have an average CAR of 11.9 percent. The difference in CARs between 
different transferors is significant at the 5 percent level (Test 1 in the last column of Table 5, 
                                                                                                                                                        
insider trading is closely monitored and, when identified, is vigorously prosecuted by the 
U.S. securities regulators. 
23 MacNeil (2002) estimates that the LLSV-index of minority shareholder protection for 
China is only two out of a possible score of six, compared to an average score of four for 
common-law jurisdictions and an average of three for all countries. He also discusses the 
difficulties of enforcing minority shareholder rights in China. 
24 The average CAR of the 339 transfers that are smaller than 20 percent of the shares 
outstanding is 13.7 percent and is significantly smaller than the average CAR of the large 
transfers at the 1 percent level.   
25 Again, the CAR around large transfers is significantly larger than the 0.6 percent CAR 
around the transfers smaller than 20 percent of the shares outstanding.  
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Panel B). There is no evidence that the identity of the transferee is significantly related to the 
CAR (Test 2 in the last row in Table 5, Panel B). For the full sample, the CAR ranges from 
13.8 percent if State Bureaucrats are the transferee to 16.6 percent if Private Entities are the 
transferee. 
The results in Panel C of Table 5, for transfers in excess of 20 percent of the shares, 
show even larger differences, ranging from 26.4 percent for transfers from State Bureaucrats 
to 9.3 percent for transfers from Private Entities. Again, these differences are significant at 
the 5 percent level (Test 1 in the last column of Table 5, Panel B). Focusing on the 
transferees, we see that the CARs range from 17.6 percent for transfers where State 
Bureaucrats are the transferee to 24.9 percent for transfers where Private Entities are the 
buyer. Even though these return differences have the expected ordering, the differences are 
not significant (Test 2 in the last row in Table 5, Panel C). 
Overall, the results in Table 5 are supportive of the incentive hypothesis, which states 
that block transfers from State Bureaucrats result in the largest wealth gains to shareholders.  
However, in this univariate analysis, there is no evidence that wealth gains are significantly 
smaller when State Bureaucrats are the buyer of larger blocks. The results in Table 5 are 
inconsistent with the added-bureaucracy hypothesis that a transfer from a State Bureaucrats 
to MOSOEs simply adds an additional level of bureaucracy to the governance structure, 
thereby reducing the quality of the government control. On the contrary, further tests show 
that the average CAR is significantly higher around transfers when State Bureaucrats are the 
transferors, than around transfers where MOSOEs are the transferors (the p-value for this 
difference in average CAR of 4.9 percent for the full sample is 0.04). The results in Table 5 
are also inconsistent with the idea that expropriation by private entities results in value 
decreases after private entities obtain control over the listed firm. 
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The substantial value increase before the announcement is consistent with the 
manipulation hypothesis as well as the incentive hypothesis.  In order to distinguish between 
the two, we partition our event window into a pre-announcement period from day t–210 
through day t–0 and a post-announcement period from day t+1 through day t+40. According 
to the manipulation hypothesis, we would expect positive CARs during the pre-
announcement period, negative CARs during the post-announcement period, and a negative 
and significant correlation coefficient between the CAR in the pre-announcement period and 
the CAR in the post-announcement period. According to the incentive hypothesis, we would 
expect positive CARs during the pre-announcement period, non-negative CARs during the 
post-announcement period, and a non-negative correlation coefficient between the two. 
Consistent with both hypotheses, the average CAR during the pre-announcement 
period for the full sample is a statistically significant 16.0%. However, the average CARs 
during the post-announcement period is positive 1.1 percent (insignificant), which is 
inconsistent with the manipulation hypothesis but supportive of the incentive hypothesis. 
Moreover, the correlation between pre-announcement (t–210 through t–0) and post-
announcement (t+1 through t+40) CARs is 0.01 and statistically insignificant, which also is 
inconsistent with the manipulation hypothesis, but supportive of the incentive hypothesis.  
We repeat these tests for each of the nine classes of block transfers and find no 
evidence of significant negative correlations for any of these classes.  We also obtain 
qualitatively similar results analyzing the correlations between the CAR for a 50-day pre-
announcement window and the CAR for a 10-day post-announcement window.  
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6.1.2 Changes in Accounting Performance  
 According to the incentive hypothesis, we expect to find significant improvements in 
accounting performance following the block transfers, and we expect these improvements to 
be significantly related to the 250-day CAR and five-day CAR.  
For each firm involved in a block transfer, we collect accounting data on firm 
performance for two years before, and two years after, the year of the block transfer 
announcement (thus excluding the year of the transfer). We test two alternative measures of 
firm performance: industry-adjusted return on assets and industry-adjusted return on equity.  
Return on assets is defined as net income divided by total assets, and return on equity 
is defined as net income divided by total equity.  For 106 firms, we were unable to obtain the 
required accounting data in the pre- or post-announcement periods and these 106 firms are 
omitted from this part of our analysis.  For the 525 remaining firms, we calculate industry-
adjusted performance in each year by subtracting the industry median for that year from the 
firm’s performance measure. We then average industry-adjusted performance for the 2 years 
in the pre-announcement period and the 2 years in the post-announcement period. Finally, we 
subtract the performance in the pre-announcement period from the performance in the post-
announcement period.  Results of this analysis appear in Table 6.   
From Panel A of Table 6, we see that, for the full sample, ROA increased by 78 basis 
points and ROE increased by 150 basis points—both significant at the 1 percent level.  
Focusing on the group of block transfers in excess of 20 percent, the improvement in adjusted 
ROA is 87 basis points, and the improvement in adjusted ROE is 169 basis points. Again, the 
improvement in each performance measure is significant at conventional levels.26 
                                                 
26 There is no significant difference in the change in industry-adjusted ROA and industry-
adjusted ROE between the transfers that are larger than 20 percent and the transfers that are 
smaller than 20 percent. 
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Panel B of Table 6 reports the change in industry-adjusted ROAs for the different 
combinations of transferors and transferees. The largest increase in industry-adjusted ROA, 
2.6 percent, is realized for the group of transfers where the transferor is State Bureaucrat and 
the transferee is a Private Entity. The differences across transferors are significant at the 10-
percent level, with the increase in adjusted ROAs highest when State Bureaucrats are 
transferor and lowest when Private Entities are transferor. The change in adjusted ROA is 
lowest when State Bureaucrats are the buyer of the block of shares and highest when Private 
Entities are the buyer of the block. Test 2, in the last row of Table 6, Panel B, indicates that 
the change in ROA is significantly related to the identity of the transferee. 
Panel C of Table 6 reports the results for the transfers in excess of 20 percent of the 
shares outstanding. For these transfers the change in ROA is not related to the identity of the 
transferor. However, similar to Panel A of Table 6, the change in adjusted ROA is 
significantly different across transferees, with the change in adjusted ROA lowest when State 
Bureaucrats are the transferees and highest when Private Entities are involved as transferees.  
In general, the results in Table 6 suggest that accounting performance improved 
following the block transfers, again favoring the incentive hypothesis over the manipulation 
hypothesis, the expropriation hypothesis, and the added-bureaucracy hypothesis. The 
differences in improvement based on the identity of the parties involved, suggest that State 
Bureaucrats are less efficient monitors than Private Entities, with MOSOEs somewhere in 
between.   
In Table 7, we report the correlations between the two performance measures and the 
two CAR measures. For both the long-term window and the short-term window, and for both 
industry-adjusted ROA and industry adjusted-ROE, we find significant positive correlations, 
ranging from 0.124 to 0.272. These highly significant correlations suggest that investors were 
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able to successfully anticipate future improvements in operating performance subsequent to 
share transfers. 
 
6.1.3. Post-transfer Changes in Top Management 
According to Barclay and Holderness (1991), a block transfer is a control event if it is 
associated with large abnormal stock returns and top-management turnover.  Even though in 
China, firms operate in a very different control environment, it is still instructive to analyze 
cross-sectional differences in top management turnover at our sample of firms.  
The results of this analysis are in Table 8. Panel A of Table 8 shows that the 
proportion of firms where the CEO was replaced within 3 months of the transfer is 22 
percent, and, within 12 months of the transfer, is 38 percent.  For block transfers larger than 
20 percent, CEO turnover is 30 percent in the 3 months after the transfer, and is 50 percent in 
the 12 months after the transfer.27 These results compare with 33 percent CEO turnover 
within the 12 months following negotiated block trades at U.S. firms, as reported by Barclay 
and Holderness (1991).  Also note that the turnover rates after block transfers are high 
compared to the average frequency with which CEOs are replaced at the typical listed 
Chinese firm, which, for our sample period, is 24 percent per annum. 
In Panels B and C of Table 8, we document the impact of the identity of the transferor 
and transferee on CEO turnover within the first 3 months after the transfer.  We find that the 
frequency of CEO replacement within three months depends significantly on the transferor, 
and is highest for transfers from Private Entities, at 29 percent, and lowest when State 
Bureaucrats are the transferors, at 18 percent. There is no significant relation between the 
type of transferee and CEO turnover for the full sample. However, for the block transfers in 
                                                 
27 The likelihood of CEO turnover in the 3 months (12 months) following the transfer 
announcement for the 339 transfers that are smaller than 20 percent of the shares outstanding 
is 15 percent (27 percent), and is significantly smaller than the likelihood of CEO turnover 
following large transfers. 
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excess of 20 percent, we do find CEO turnover is also significantly related to the type of 
transferee, with turnover ranging from 19 percent when State Bureaucrats are the buyers of 
the block to 39 percent when a Private Entity is the buyer of the block. These results are 
supportive of the hypothesis that the identity of the block holder is an important determinant 
of CEO turnover.  
Finally, in Panel D, we explore the reasons for CEO Turnover using data from the 
GTA corporate governance database. GTA classifies the reason for CEO turnover into twelve 
categories that we collapse into seven: (1) change in work assignment; (2) expiration of term 
in office; (3) change of controlling shareholder; (4) resignation; (5) corporate governance 
improvement; (6) missing; and (7) other. 28  
In columns 2-4 of Panel D are the results for CEO turnover at all listed Chinese firms 
during the period spanning 1998-2002. There are a total of 5,272 firm-years covered by these 
data. In columns 5-7 of Panel D are the results for our full sample of 631 firms covering CEO 
turnover during the 3 months following the transfer announcements. There are a total of 631 
firms × 0.25 years = 157.75 firm-years in this group. In columns 8-10 are the results for our 
full sample covering CEO turnover during the 12 months following the transfer 
                                                 
28 The 13 categorized reasons for CEO turnover available from the GTA corporate 
governance database are: (1) change of work assignment—the CEO was removed from the 
position because of being assigned another position; (2) retirement—the CEO no longer held 
the position because of retirement or age; (3) expiration of term of office—the CEO no 
longer held the position because her term expired and she was not re-elected; (4) change of 
share-controlling rights—the CEO no longer held the position because of a change in the 
identity of the controlling shareholder ; (5) resignation—the predecessor voluntarily resigned 
the position for unknown reasons; (6) dismissal—a listed company dismissed the predecessor 
for unknown reasons (7) health related reason—the predecessor no longer held the position 
because of bad health, including death (8) personal reason—the CEO no longer held the 
position because of personal reasons;  (9) corporate governance improvement—improving 
corporate governance led to the CEO no longer holding the position; (10) litigation 
involved—the CEO was removed from office because of involvement in litigation; (11)  
others; (12) end of proxy—the CEO holding the position in deputy no longer exercised the 
duty because of end of the deputy; and (13) not disclosed. We combine (2), (6), (7), (8), (10), 
(11) and (12) into our “other” category because of the small numbers of CEO turnovers 
accounted for these categories. 
.  
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announcements. There are 631 firms × 1.00 years = 631 firm-years in this group. For each of 
these three groups, we report the total number of CEO changes (columns 2, 5 and 8), the 
number of CEO changes per firm-year (columns 3, 6 and 9), and the percentage of the total 
number of CEO changes for that group accounted for by each reason identified in column (1). 
Most relevant are the number of CEO changes per firm-year (columns 3, 6 and 9). 
CEO turnover attributable to a ‘change of share controlling rights’ is 0.02 per firm year for all 
listed firms, 0.37 per firm year for our sample during the 3 months following the block 
transfer announcement and 0.12 for our sample during the 12 months following the block 
transfer announcement. Using the binomial test, we find that these proportions are 
significantly higher for our sample firms than for the total sample. The same result holds for 
the categories ‘change of work assignment’, ‘expiration of term of office’, ‘resignation’ and 
‘missing’ for the three-month sample, and ‘expiration of term of office’, ‘resignation’, 
‘missing’, and ‘other’ for the twelve-month sample.  
Also relevant are the percentage of all CEO changes in each group accounted for by 
the ‘change of share controlling rights.’ For all listed firms, change in control rights accounts 
for 10 percent of all CEO turnovers; but for our sample, this reason accounts for 42 percent of 
the CEO changes that occur with 3 months, and 33 percent of the CEO changes that occur 
with 12 months, of the block-transfer announcements. Clearly, these results demonstrate that 
the high incidence of CEO turnover in our sample is a direct result of the block transfers. 
 
6.2 Cross-sectional Regressions 
 To provide additional evidence on the sources of abnormal returns, the changes in 
accounting performance and CEO turnover, we also perform cross-sectional regressions. We 
use the type of transferor and transferee as our explanatory variables and include several 
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control variables.  For each of the dependent variables, we estimate the following cross-
sectional regression model: 
DVi = β0 + β1 Transferor-Bureaucrati + β2 Transferor-MOSOEi + β3 Transferee-
Bureaucrati + β4 Transferee-MOSOEi + β5 Relatedi +  β6   Largest Changei  + β7 PCTi  
+  β8 Leverage Ratioi + β9  Sizei + εi 
where: 
 DVi is, for firm i, the 250–day or 5–day cumulative abnormal return; the change in industry-
adjusted return on assets or industry-adjusted return on equity; or a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if the CEO was replaced in the first 3 months or 12 months after the transfer 
announcement.   
Transferor-Bureaucrati,  Transferor-MOSOEi  Transferee-Bureaucrati and Transferee-
MOSOEi are dummy variables indicating the type of negotiated block transfer;  
Transferor-Private and Transferee-Private are the omitted categories, so the coefficient on 
each of the Transferor and Transferee dummy variables measures the difference in the 
dependent variable (DV) of that category and the dependent variable of transfers involving 
Private Entities.   
Relatedi is a dummy variable indicating that the transferee is a related party of the transferor. 
Parties are related if, one party is directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by another 
party, or both parties are under the control of the same enterprise. We expect the benefits of 
block transfers to be lower when the transfer is to a related party. 
Largest Changei is a dummy variable indicating that the transfer created a new controlling 
block holder for firm i. It might be important to distinguish between a transfer that creates a 
new controlling block holder and one that does not.  When the block transfer creates a new 
largest shareholder, there has been a change in corporate control.  According to Barclay and 
Holderness (1991), block transfers as small as ten percent of outstanding shares can transfer 
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de facto control rights. Because of the strong position of the controlling shareholder in China, 
we expect the positive effects of the block transfers to be larger when the new block holder 
obtains a controlling share. 
PCTi is defined as the number of shares that is transferred in the block transfer as percentage 
of the shares outstanding. 
 As general control variables, we include:  
Leverage Ratio as measured by the ratio of total debt to total assets and  
Firm Size as measured by the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  
We expect that excess returns and operating performance improvement will be larger at firms 
with greater informational asymmetries, as agency costs are expected to increase with the 
level of informational asymmetries. Because larger firms are less opaque than smaller firms, 
we hypothesize that excess returns will be inversely related to firm size. In Western 
economies, firms with greater leverage are subject to more stringent monitoring by large 
creditors, including commercial banks, so that informational asymmetries should be smaller 
than at firms with greater leverage.  However, in China, commercial banks are often directed 
by the State to make policy loans, so that banks do not serve this monitoring role in China.  
Instead, banks are directed by the State to make additional loans to poorly performing firms, 
increasing their leverage over time. Hence, we expect that excess returns will be positively 
related to the debt-to-asset ratio, as the worst performing firms have the most to gain from 
improved governance.29 
Table 9 presents the results of our cross-sectional regression models. For each 
dependent variable, we first present the results for the total sample and then, in the next 
column, report the results for the sample of transfers larger than 20 percent.  
 
                                                 
29 We have estimated all models including year dummy variables, industry dummy variables 
and exchange dummy variables. Our results are robust to inclusion of these dummy variables. 
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6.2.1 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
In columns 2 and 3 of Table 9, we use the 250–day CAR as our dependent variable. 
Column 2 reports the results for the full sample, and column 3 reports the results for the 
sample of transfers that are larger than 20 percent of the shares outstanding. Both 
Transferor_Bureaucrat and Transferor_MOSOE are significantly positive. Both 
Transferee_Bureaucrat and Transferee_MOSOE are negative, as expected, but are 
insignificant. The dummy variables are economically significant. Ceteris paribus, transfers 
from State Bureaucrats to Private Entities result in a 250-day CAR that is 13 percent greater 
than that for transfers between Private Entities (the omitted dummy variables) for the full 
sample. For the group of transfers larger than 20 percent of the shares outstanding, this 
difference in the 250-day CARs is 25 percent.   
The results using the 5-day CAR, in columns 4 and 5 of Table 9, are generally 
consistent with those using the 250-day CAR, again suggesting that investors perceive 
Private Entities to be superior monitors compared to State Bureaucrats and MOSOEs.  
The coefficient of Related is always insignificant, indicating that investors do not 
perceive the value change resulting from transactions between related parties as different 
from transactions between unrelated parties.  
The coefficient of Largest Change is positive but insignificant.  We had expected that 
transfers creating a new controlling block holder would be associated with greater cumulative 
abnormal returns, but this does not appear to be the case when we control for the type of 
block transfer. Similarly, Percentage is only weakly related to the 250-day or the 5-day 
CARs.  
Contrary to our expectations, we find that firms with lower Leverage experience 
larger value increases over the 250-day period. Consistent with our expectations, Firm Size is 
significantly negatively related to the increase in firm value. This smaller value increase for 
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larger firms could reflect the lower information asymmetry at larger firms. The negative 
relation between firm size and the value change could also indicate that it is more difficult to 
restructure a larger firm. 
In summary, the cross-sectional analysis of abnormal returns shows no consistent 
evidence that State Bureaucrats are less effective monitors than MOSOEs. However, we do 
find consistent evidence that investors perceive Private Entities as the most effective 
monitors of listed firms. 
 
6.2.2 Changes in Accounting Performance 
Columns 6-9 of Table 9 present the results for changes in industry-adjusted return on 
assets (columns 6-7) and industry-adjusted return on equity (columns 8-9). The evidence in 
these four columns consistently shows that improvements in operating performance are larger 
where State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs are replaced by Private Entities as the block holder. 
The coefficients indicate that, relative to transfers between Private Entities (the omitted 
dummy variables), very substantial improvements in return on assets of 240 basis points or 
more are realized after block transfers from State Bureaucrats or MOSOEs to Private 
Entities. Using the ROE as performance measure (columns 8-9), relative improvements are 
even larger, at 530 basis points or more. If a block is sold to a State Bureaucrat, performance 
is significantly worse relative to a having a new Private Entity as owner. However, when a 
MOSOE is the new block holder, the listed firm does not significantly under-perform listed 
firms where a Private Entity is the new owner.  
With the exception of firm size, all control variables are insignificant. The negative 
relation between the improvement in firm performance and firm size suggests that it is more 
difficult for new block holders to transform larger firms. 
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6.2.3 CEO turnover 
In columns 10 through 13 of Table 9 are the results from a logistic regression, where 
the dependent variable is an indicator variable that is equal to one if the firm’s CEO was 
replaced within 3 months (columns 10-11) or twelve months (columns 12-13) of the block 
trade announcement. In each cell, we now report the marginal effect with the t-statistic 
underneath. After inclusion of the control variables, we find only limited evidence that the 
ownership type affects CEO replacement. Most interesting is that, for the full sample, 
replacement of the CEO within 3 months is significantly lower if a State Bureaucrat is 
transferor and that, for the sample of large transfers, CEO-replacement within 3 months is 
less likely if a State Bureaucrat is transferee. These coefficients are no longer significant 
when we use CEO-replacement within 12 months as dependent variable. Thus, even though 
Private Entities seem to be faster in forcing CEO replacement, the probability of CEO 
replacement within a year is not significantly related to ownership type.  
The control variables are more effective in explaining CEO turnover. The variable 
Related is negative and significant, suggesting that the probability of CEO replacement 
within 12 months is lower if the block is transferred to a related party. The variable Largest 
Change, which indicates that the new block holder is also a new controlling block holder, is 
positive and generally significant, indicating that changes in direct control lead to a greater 
probability of CEO turnover. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find that Leverage is 
related to CEO turnover. However, Size is negative and significant, indicating that larger 
firms are significantly less likely to experience a change in top management following a 
block transfer.  We speculate that this result also may be a consequence of the stronger 
political connections of CEOs at China’s larger firms. 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
In this study, we analyze share price reactions and changes in accounting performance 
around the announcements of negotiated block transfers between different ownership 
structures, using a sample of firms that are publicly traded on Chinese stock exchanges.  We 
also analyze top-management turnover following these block transfers.  
We find that both changes in firm value and accounting performance are much greater 
when ownership is transferred from State Bureaucrats or Market-Oriented SOEs to Private 
Entities, than when ownership is transferred between different State-controlled entities. The 
improvements in performance following block transfers from State-controlled entities to 
private owners indicates that the latter are better equipped and have greater incentives to 
monitor and discipline firm management than are the former. This result is consistent with a 
smaller wedge between cash-flow rights and control rights for private block holders than for 
State-controlled block holders. We find no consistent evidence that Market-Oriented SOEs 
are superior monitors relative to State Bureaucrats. This result is important, as it suggests that 
the intermediate step of ‘corporatizing’ organizations that act as block holder, is an 
ineffective mechanism for dealing with the agency problems that result from State ownership.  
Our results provide strong evidence that the block transfers between the different 
ownership categories are true control events, as defined by Barclay and Holderness (1991).  
First, they result in large positive cumulative abnormal returns of more than 10 percent, and 
the cross-sectional variation in these abnormal returns can be explained by differences in 
identities of the block holders.  Second, the block transfers are followed by top management 
changes within 3 months of the transfer at more than 20 percent of the sample firms, and, 
again, these changes are related to the identities of the new block holders. Our interpretation 
of these block transfers as significant control events is further corroborated by the evidence 
that the value changes around transfers are strongly correlated with improvements in 
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accounting performance around the block transfer. Hence, we contribute new evidence from 
Chinese markets confirming that the identity of the block holder is an important determinant 
of firm value.   
Finally, it is remarkable that the improvements in performance around the block 
transfers to private entities in our sample are substantially larger than the changes in 
performance observed after Share-Issue Privatization (SIP) in China (see Sun and Tong, 
2003). The common explanation for the limited success of the SIP process in China is that the 
SIPs failed to transfer true control from the State to the private sector and only helped to 
create many dispersed and powerless owners of Tradable A shares. Our evidence is consistent 
with this explanation and shows that substantial value increases are realized when the State 
relinquishes substantial control rights to private block holders.  Of great interest is how 
further or complete privatization of listed State-controlled firms will affect firm value.  Many 
such transfers of control are now taking place in China, and we leave this as an interesting 
avenue for future research.  
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Appendix I 
Shares are classified based on the residency of their owner as domestic (A shares) or 
foreign (B, H and N shares).  The B, H, and N shares are traded on the Chinese, Hong Kong, 
and New York Stock Exchanges, respectively.  Tradable B shares used to be available 
exclusively to foreign investors and some authorized domestic securities firms. However, the 
Chinese government recently opened the B-share market to domestic investors. The B-share 
market is separated from the A-share market, with SHSE B-shares denominated in U.S. 
dollars, and SZSE B-shares denominated in Hong Kong dollars. Tradable H shares and 
Tradable N shares are essentially the same as Tradable B shares, except that they are issued 
and traded on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange and the New York Stock Exchange, 
respectively. 
Appendix Table A1 presents a classification of listed firms by share categories from 
1993 to 2002. From Table A1, it can be seen that companies with A-shares only are most 
common, and their numbers are growing at a relatively rapid rate. Companies with A-shares 
and B-shares represent the second most prevalent category. 
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Appendix Table A1: 
Classification of firms by official share categories for the Chinese stock markets: 1993-2002 
This table shows the number of listed Chinese firms issuing different categories of common shares. A-Shares are common shares that can only be held by domestic owners. B-Shares 
are common shares that are only available to foreign investors and some authorized domestic securities firms. The market for B-Shares is separated from that for A-shares, with 
Shanghai Stock Exchange B-Shares denominated in U.S. dollars, and Shenzhen B-Shares denominated in Hong-Kong dollars. Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission, 
2004.  
 
                                    1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Issuing A shares only 140 227 242 431 627 727 822 955        1,025        1,085 
Issuing A and H shares 3 6 11 14 17 18 19 19 23 28
Issuing A and B shares 34 54 58 69 76 80 82 86 88 87
Issuing B shares only 6 4 12 16 25 26 26 28 24 24
Total 183 291 323 530 745 851 949        1,088        1,160        1,224 
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Table 1: 
Number of listed companies on the Chinese stock exchanges by year: 1992-2002 
Total listed refers to the total number of companies listing shares on either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in each year from 1992 
through 2002.  Market Capitalization and Annual Turnover (annual sales) are in billions of U.S. dollars. Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission, 2004. 
 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Shanghai Stock Exchange 29 106 171 188 293 383 438 484 572 646 715
Shenzhen Stock Exchange 24 77 120 135 237 362 413 465 516 512 509
Total Listed Firms 53 183 291 323 530 745 851 949 1,088 1,158 1,224
Market Capitalization 12.7 42.5 44.4 41.8 118.5 211.2 235 318.9 579.4 527.5 464.6
Annual Turnover 8.3 44.2 47.9 48.6 257 370.1 283.6 377.3 732.8 464.3 339.3
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Table 2: 
Official share classifications for the Chinese stock market from 1992 to 2002 
Each row presents the percentage of total common shares by share classification, with the exception of the last row, which shows the total number of shares outstanding in millions. 
Official share classifications as defined by the China Securities Regulatory Commission are classified based on the residency of their owner as domestic (A shares) or foreign (B, H 
and N shares).  Domestic A shares are further divided into State shares, Legal-Person shares, Tradable A shares, and Employee shares. State shares are those held by government 
agencies (the Bureau of State Property Management and local finance bureaus) and State-owned enterprises. Legal-Person (LP) shares are those owned by domestic institutions or a 
legal entity that is not an individual. Tradable A shares are owned by individuals and domestic corporations, but are not allowed to be owned by foreign investors. Tradable A-shares 
are the only type of equity that can be publicly traded among domestic investors. Employee shares are owned by the employees of a listed company. Foreign shares include Tradable 
B and H shares, which are traded on the Shanghai/Shenzhen Exchanges and the Hong-Kong Exchange, respectively.  Tradable B shares are only available to foreign investors and 
some authorized domestic securities firms. Tradable H shares are essentially the same as Tradable B shares, except that they are issued and traded on the Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange.  Source: China Securities Regulatory Commission 2004 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Tradable Shares
A Shares 15.8% 15.8% 21.0% 21.2% 21.9% 22.8% 24.1% 26.3% 28.4% 25.3% 25.7%
B Shares 14.8% 6.4% 6.1% 6.7% 6.4% 6.0% 5.3% 4.6% 4.0% 3.1% 2.9%
H Shares 0.0% 5.6% 6.0% 7.7% 6.9% 5.7% 4.7% 4.0% 3.3% 6.4% 6.1%
Non-Tradable Shares
State Shares 41.8% 49.1% 43.3% 38.7% 35.4% 31.5% 34.3% 36.2% 38.9% 46.2% 47.2%
Legal-Person Shares 26.4% 20.7% 22.5% 24.6% 27.2% 30.7% 28.3% 26.6% 23.8% 18.3% 17.3%
Employee Shares 1.2% 2.4% 1.0% 0.4% 1.2% 2.0% 2.0% 1.2% 0.6% 0.5% 0.3%
Others 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% 1.0% 1.2% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 0.3% 0.5%
Total Number of Common Shares 69.37        387.73      684.54      848.42      1,220        1,943        2,527        3,087        3,792        5,218        5,875         
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Table 3 
Share classifications for the Chinese Stock Market for 1993-2002 based upon NUS ownership categories 
State Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is 
a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private Entity is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Foreign is a dummy variable equal to one if 
the largest block holder is a foreign entity.  Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of 
Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). The total number of firms in each year does not match those in Table 1 because NUS researchers were unable to classify 
ultimate ownership for a small number of firms in some years. 
Source: Authors’ tabulations based upon NUS ownership categories. 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
State Bureaucrat 53 77 121 166 179 160 144 153 154 155
Market-Oriented SOE 46 71 141 277 462 572 681 796 836 888
Private Entity 13 12 23 35 44 63 78 103 121 155
Foreign Entity 9 10 13 18 16 13 11 15 13 13
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Table 4: 
Descriptive statistics for block transfers  
The sample consists of 631 observations of block-share transfers between different ownership categories during 
1998-2002. Panel A presents descriptive statistics for four variables:  Shares Transferred is the percentage of total 
common shares transferred in the block trade; Size is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets; 
Leverage is measured by ratio of the book value of total liabilities to the book value of total assets; and Industry-
adjusted ROA is the firm’s net income divided by the book value of total assets (ROA) as of year-end less the 
median ROA for the firms in the same industry in the same year. Panel B presents the number of transfers for each 
pair of transferor/transferee. Panel C presents the percentage of shares transferred for each pair of 
transferor/transferee. Panel D presents the firm size for each pair of transferor/transferee. Panel E presents firm 
leverage for each pair of transferor/transferee. Panel F presents industry-adjusted ROA for pair of 
transferor/transferee. Transferor refers to the party selling the block of shares while Transferee refers to the party 
purchasing the block of shares. Bureaucrats is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified 
as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented 
State-owned enterprise; Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. 
Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the 
National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). Test 1 refers to the p-value from an 
F-test for equality of means across the three different types of transferors. Test 2 refers to the p-value from an F-
test for equality of means across the three different types of transferees. 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Shares Transferred 22.0 15.5 5.0 74.8
Size 20.5 0.8 18.1 23.8
Leverage 0.47 0.29 0.01 4.87
Industry-adjusted ROA -0.012 0.051 -0.323 0.159  
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Panel B: Number of Transfers for each Transferor/Transferee pair
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 38 80 49 167
MOSOE 39 187 114 340
Private 8 41 75 124
All 85 308 238 631
   
Panel C: Transfer Percentage for each Transferor/Transferee pair
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 28.24 31.12 17.64 26.51
MOSOE 22.67 25.18 16.34 22.01 Test 1:  
Private 21.05 17.76 14.80 17.64 p -value = 0.01
All 25.01 25.73 16.12 22.01
Test 2: p -value = 0.01
Panel D: Firm Size for each Transferor/Transferee pair
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 20.61 20.57 20.37 20.52
MOSOE 20.66 20.61 20.47 20.58 Test 1:  
Private 19.92 20.09 20.21 20.09 p -value = 0.01
All 20.57 20.53 20.37 20.48
Test 2: p -value = 0.05
Panel E: Leverage for each Transferor/Transferee pair
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 0.445 0.485 0.483 0.48
MOSOE 0.475 0.468 0.486 0.48 Test 1:
Private 0.381 0.440 0.441 0.43 p -value = 0.46
All 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.47
Test 2: p- value = 0.87
Panel F: Industry-Adjusted ROA for each Transferor/Transferee pair
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats -0.006 -0.020 -0.023 -0.018
MOSOE -0.007 -0.012 -0.010 -0.010 Test 1:
Private 0.016 -0.009 -0.011 -0.004  p -value = 0.55
All -0.005 -0.014 -0.013 -0.012
Test 2: p -value = 0.98
Transferee
Transferee
Transferee
Transferee
Transferee
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Table 5: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Announcements of Block Transfers 
By Type of Block Transfer 
Cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of block transfers are calculated as the difference between the 
realized return and the market return using the market-adjusted return model. To estimate the market-adjusted 
model, we use as the market index either the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
(SZSE) composite index, depending on where the firm’s stock is listed. Our primary event window spans day t–
210 through day t+40. We also examine abnormal returns from a shorter five-day window from day t–3 through 
day t+1. The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of more than five percent of common 
shares between different ownership categories during 1998-2002. The categories are Bureaucrats, MOSOE and 
Private. Bureaucrats is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; 
MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; 
Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Classifications are based 
upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of 
Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). We also examine block transfers where at least 20 percent 
of the common shares are transferred.  
 
N Mean Std. Dev. T-stat Minimum Maximum
Transfers Car(-210,40) 631 11.59 -1.464 2.325
Greater than 5% Car(-3,1) 631 6.57 -0.319 0.198
Transfers Car(-210,40) 292 8.91 -1.465 1.485
Greater than 20% Car(-3,1) 292 6.21 -0.103 0.198
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 0.172 ** 0.214 ** 0.250 **
38 80 49 167
MOSOE 0.111 ** 0.185 ** 0.158 **
39 187 114 340
Private 0.106 0.106 0.128 **
8 41 75 124      p -value=0.04
All 0.138 ** 0.181 ** 0.166 **
85 308 238 631
Test 2: p -value=0.62
Transferor Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
Bureaucrats 0.209 ** 0.266 ** 0.336 **
27 56 19 102
MOSOE 0.171 0.198 ** 0.246 **
17 99 33 149
Private -0.026 0.039 0.168 **
4 18 19 41  p -value=0.05
All 0.176 ** 0.203 ** 0.249 **
48 173 71 292
Test 2: p -value = 0.58
Transferee
Panel B: CARs for transfers >5% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Transfer Announcements
Panel C: CARs for transfers >20% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Transferee
0.171
0.011
0.210
0.017
0.370
0.043
0.402
0.048
       0.216**
   0.210**
       0.167**
       0.119**  Test 1
       0.171**
   0.093**   Test 1
   0.205**
   0.264**
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Table 6: 
Changes in Accounting Performance surrounding Block Transfers 
Changes in accounting performance are measured by the changes in return on assets (ROA) or return on equity 
(ROE) from the two years prior to the block transfer to the two years subsequent to the block transfer. 
The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of more than five percent of common shares 
between different ownership categories during 1998-2002. The categories are Bureaucrats, MOSOE and Private. 
Bureaucrat is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is 
a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 
detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of Singapore 
(“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). We also examine block transfers where at least 20 percent of the 
common shares are transferred 
 
N Mean Std. Dev. t -stat Minimum Maximum
Transfers ∆ ROA 525 0.0078 0.058 3.07 -0.258 0.265
> 5% ∆ ROE 525 0.0150 0.122 2.81 -0.470 0.570
Transfers ∆  ROA 249 0.0087 0.061 2.25 -0.258 0.210
>20% ∆ ROE 249 0.0169 0.138 1.94 -0.470 0.531
Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
-0.007 0.015 * 0.026 ** 0.012 **
34 67 36 137
-0.009 0.013 ** 0.010 * 0.009 **
34 162 89 285
-0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.003       Test 1:  
7 36 60 103       p-value=0.10
-0.008 * 0.011 ** 0.010 ** 0.008
75 265 185 525
Test 2: p-value=0.04
Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
-0.010 0.013 0.018 0.008
24 48 15 87
-0.009 0.013 * 0.019 ** 0.012 *
15 84 27 126
-0.005 -0.023 0.022 0.000       Test 1:  
2 17 17 36       p-value=0.56
-0.010 0.009 * 0.020 ** 0.009
41 149 59 249
Test 2: p-value=0.05
           All
           Transferor
          Bureaucrat
           MOSOE
           Private
Transferee
Panel A: Changes in ROA and Changes in ROE
Panel B: Changes in ROA for Transfers > 5% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Panel C: Changes in ROA for Transfers > 20% of Common Shares by Type of Transfer
Transferee
           Transferor
           Bureaucrats
           MOSOE
           Private
           All
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Table 7:   
Correlations between CARs and Changes in Accounting Performance 
This table presents the Spearman correlation coefficient between the cumulative abnormal 
return around 525 block transfers of listed firms in China in the period 1998 through 2002 and 
changes in industry-adjusted return on assets and return on equity. We use the market-adjusted 
return model to calculate daily abnormal returns as the difference between the realized return 
and the market return. The CAR is measured over a window that spans day t-210 through day 
t+40, and a 5-day window from day t-3 through day t+1. Industry-adjusted return on assets 
(ROA) is the firm’s net income divided by the book value of total assets as of year-end minus 
the median ROA for the firms in the same industry.  Industry-adjusted return on equity (ROE) 
is the firm’s net income divided by the book value of equity as of year-end minus the median 
ROE for the firms in the same industry. We define industry sectors at the level of two-digit SIC 
codes, which we obtained from the CSRC. Change in ROA/ROE is the difference in the 
averages for the two years prior to the announcement and the two years subsequent to the 
announcement. The year of the announcement is excluded from the analysis. 
Car(-150,50) Car(-3,1)
Change in ROA 0.250 ** 0.124 **
Change in ROE 0.272 ** 0.158 **  
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Table 8: 
CEO Turnover following Announcements of Block Transfers 
This table reports CEO turnover during the 3 months or 12 months following announcement of 631 block transfers 
of at least 5% of common shares between different ownership categories for listed firms in China during 1998-
2002. The categories are Bureaucrats, MOSOE and Private. Bureaucrats is a dummy variable equal to one if the 
largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is a market-oriented State-owned enterprise; Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block 
holder is a private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established 
by researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as described in Delios et al. (2006). We also 
examine block transfers where at least 20 percent of the common shares are transferred. 
 
N Mean Std Dev. t -stat Minim Maxim
Within 3 months 631 0.22 0.41 13.2 0 1
Withing 12 months 631 0.38 0.49 19.5 0 1
Within 3 months 292 0.30 0.46 11.1 0 1
Within 12 months 292 0.50 0.50 16.9 0 1
Panel B: CEO Turnover in the 3 months following Transfers > 5% of Common Shares
Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
0.211 0.175 0.163 0.180
38 80 49 167
0.103 0.214 0.237 0.209
39 187 114 340
0.375 0.366 0.240 0.290 Test 1:
8 41 75 124 p-value=0.07
0.176 0.224 0.223 0.217
85 308 238 631
Test 2: p-value=0.62
Panel C: CEO Turnover in the 3 months following Transfers > 20% of Common Shares
Bureaucrats MOSOE Private All
0.185 0.232 0.368 0.245
27 56 19 102
0.118 0.293 0.364 0.289
17 99 33 149
0.500 0.444 0.474 0.463 Test 1:
4 18 19 41 p-value=0.03
All 0.188 0.289 0.394 0.298
48 173 71 292
Test 2: p-value=0.04
Panel A: CEO Turnover in the 3 months and 12 months after Share Transfer Announcement
Transferee
      Bureacrats
      Transferor
       Private
     MOSOE
     Private
     All
       MOSOE
Transferee
        Transferor
       Bureacrats
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Panel D: Reason for CEO Turnover 
 
Reason for CEO Turnover
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Change of Work Assignment 345 0.065 0.28 14 0.089 ** 0.10 43 0.068 0.18
Expiration of Term of Office 290 0.055 0.23 28 0.178 ** 0.20 54 0.086 ** 0.23
Change of Share Controlling Right 120 0.023 0.10 58 0.368 ** 0.42 78 0.124 ** 0.33
Resignation 229 0.043 0.18 24 0.152 ** 0.18 37 0.059 ** 0.16
Corporate Governance Improvement 31 0.006 0.03 0 0.000 ** 0.00 3 0.005 0.01
Missing 77 0.015 0.06 9 0.057 ** 0.07 14 0.022 ** 0.06
Other 148 0.028 0.12 4 0.025 0.03 9 0.014 ** 0.04
Total 1240 0.235 1.00 137 0.869 1.00 238 0.377 1.00
All firms Transfer sample Transfer sample
1998-2002 < 3 months < 12 months
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Table 9: 
Cross-sectional Regression Results Analyzing Block Transfers 
Column (1) identifies the independent variable being analyzed. Columns (2) and (3) present the results for analysis of the 250-day cumulative abnormal return from t-210 to 
t+40 around the announcement of block transfers. Columns (4) and (5) present the results for analysis of the five-day cumulative abnormal returns from t-3 to t+1 around 
announcements of block transfers. Columns (6) and (7) present the results for analysis of changes in profitability as measured by ROA during the two years before to the two 
years after the year of block transfers. Columns (8) and (9) present the results for analysis of changes in profitability as measured by ROE during the two years before to the 
two years after the year of block transfers. Columns (10) and (11) present the results for analysis of CEO turnover during the 3 months following announcements of block 
transfers and columns (12) and (13) present the results for analysis of CEO turnover during 12 months following announcements of block transfers. For each pair of columns, 
the first presents results for block transfers greater than 5 percent while the second presents results for block transfers greater than 20 percent of common shares. 
The sample consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories during 1998-2002. The 
categories are Bureaucrats, MOSOE and Private. Bureaucrats is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder classified as a State Bureaucrat; MOSOE is a 
dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a market oriented State-owned enterprise; Private is a dummy variable equal to one if the largest block holder is a 
private entity. Classifications are based upon 17 detailed categories of ultimate ownership established by researchers at the National University of Singapore (“NUS”) as 
described in Delios et al. (2006).  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13)
All >20 All >20 All >20 All >20 All >20 All >20
Car_250 Car_250 Car_5 Car_5 ROA ROA ROE ROE CEO_3 CEO_3 CEO_12 CEO_12
Intercept 2.186 2.713 0.128 0.223 0.330 0.301 0.779 0.721
6.1 a 4.7 a 3.0 a 3.3 a 5.2 a 3.0 a 6.0 a 3.3 a
Transferor
     Bureaucrats 0.128 0.247 0.007 0.018 0.030 0.028 0.062 0.081 -0.103 0.131 -0.084 -0.131
2.8 a 3.3 a 1.4 1.9 3.7 a 2.0 b 3.7 a 2.7 a -2.1 b -1.6 -1.5 -1.4
     MOSOE 0.082 0.186 0.011 0.020 0.024 0.028 0.053 0.089 -0.056 -0.094 -0.037 -0.066
2.1 b 2.6 b 2.4 b 2.3 b 3.3 a 2.1 b 3.7 a 3.1 a -1.4 -1.3 -0.7 -0.8
Transferee 
     Bureaucrats -0.051 -0.099 -0.007 -0.009 -0.022 -0.027 -0.046 -0.069 -0.035 -0.143 0.023 -0.115
-1.1 -1.3 -1.3 -1.0 -2.7 a -1.9 -2.7 a -2.3 b -0.7 -2.1 b 0.4 -1.3
     MOSOE -0.004 -0.066 -0.010 -0.020 -0.003 -0.008 -0.002 -0.035 -0.004 -0.055 0.057 -0.014
-0.1 -1.1 -2.5 a -2.9 a -0.4 -0.7 -0.2 -1.5 -0.1 -0.9 1.4 -0.2
    Related 0.039 0.011 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.011 0.015 0.022 -0.049 -0.018 -0.134 -0.161
0.9 0.2 0.4 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 -0.9 -0.2 -2.1 b -2.0 b
    Largest Change -0.001 -0.037 0.005 0.003 0.000 -0.010 -0.014 -0.013 0.139 0.138 0.201 0.187
-0.8 -0.6 1.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.9 -1.1 -0.5 3.6 a 1.9 4.4 a 2.4 a
    Percentage 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.001
      Transferred 1.1 0.1 2.2 b 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.0 0.2 0.5 -0.7
    Leverage -0.049 -0.217 0.002 0.017 0.007 -0.007 0.028 -0.003 0.002 0.011 -0.003 0.174
-2.1 b -2.1 b 0.6 1.4 0.8 -0.3 1.4 -0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.3
    Size -0.102 0.123 -0.006 -0.011 -0.017 -0.015 -0.040 -0.038 -0.089 -0.106 -0.114 -0.125
-5.8 a -4.3 a -3.0 a -3.3 a -5.4 a -3.0 a -6.2 a -3.4 a -4.2 a -2.9 a -4.8 a -3.3 a
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Figure 1: 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns around Announcements of Negotiated Block Transfers at Chinese Firms 
Cumulative abnormal returns around announcements of block transfers are calculated as the difference between the realized return and the 
market return using the market-adjusted return model. To estimate the market-adjusted model, we use as the market index either the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange (SHSE) or Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) composite index, depending on where the firm’s stock is listed. The sample 
consists of 631 observations of block share transfers of more than five percent of common shares between different ownership categories during 
1998-2002. 
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